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Conclusion
Examination of witnesses is essential to the orderly and equitable
administration of a bankrupt's estate. Not only is the information derived from the bankrupt necessary but also that which is obtained
from other informed persons. This is recognized by the requirements
in both sections discussed above. Under both, the persons involved
are compelled under threat of contempt proceedings to appear and
submit to interrogation.
But the bankrupt's testimony is privileged while that of the other
witnesses is not. Such a discrimination is unwarranted and inequitable. All parties should be protected to the same degree. Particularly is the injustice reflected in the case of corporate representatives wherein the discrimination is based upon a superficial and invalid
distinction. Since the terms of the statute do not admit of the necessary extension of immunity, it should be granted by legislative
amendment.

TORT LIABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICERS IN NEW YORK

Introduction
"... [G]overnment means those innumerable officials who collect our taxes and grant us patents and inspect our drains.... They
are fallible beings because they are human, and if they do wrong it is
in truth no other derogation than the admission of their human
fallibility. ...

"1

The tremendous expansion in recent years of governmental activity and the concomitant increase in the number of public officers
have emphasized the truth of the statement that few can avoid contact with administrative authorities. 2 Almost every phase of human
endeavor involves, directly or indirectly, recourse to an administrative
agency or dealings with a public official. These officials in the course
of their duties are sometimes guilty of wrongs. It is when these
wrongs proximately cause injury to third parties that the question
arises with regard to the tort liability of administrative officers.
The tort liability of a public officer is materially distinct from
that of a private citizen. Rarely does the latter have imposed upon
1 Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARv. L. Rtv. 447,
472 (1919).
2 See Freund, Historical Survey in THE GROWTH OF AMmIcAx ADmiNisTRATvE LAw 17 (1923).
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him the duty to act.3 If he chooses to act where he is under no legal
obligation to do so, then, in most instances, if the act adversely affects
the person or property of another, it will render him liable regardless
of his good faith. 4 Thus, unwarranted interference by a private individual is discouraged by requiring the actor to ".

.

. ascertain at

his peril the facts and the law upon which the rightfulness of his
interference depends." 5
The administrative official, on the other hand, is under a duty
to perform his functions and, when a private suit does not lie to compel such performance 6 or to render him personally liable for nonaction, 7 he may nevertheless suffer the consequence of removal from
office for his failure. The public officer is thus under a compulsion
to act with respect to others whereas the private citizen enjoys, as it
were, a privilege of selection with no culpability for non-action and,
indeed, with an inducement not to act. This initial consideration
is a prerequisite to a complete appreciation of the question involved
for it illustrates the necessity for the application of different norms.8
At first blush, it would seem' desirable to hold the public officer
completely liable in order to indemnify individuals for the damages
they suffer as the result of a wrongful administrative act,9 since such
plenary liability might serve to curb the excesses of an overweening
bureaucracy.' 0 Conversely, the best interests of public policy demand
that responsible persons fill administrative positions, but such men
will hesitate to accept these offices if to do so would entail heavy personal liability. 1 The problem, therefore, becomes one of adjusting
the respective interests of the private individual and the officer in
3 See Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (1928) ;

PROSSER,

TORTS 192 (1941) ; see Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.
Supp. 134, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
4 Wallenstein v. Rosebaum, 241 App. Div. 374, 272 N.Y. Supp. 346 (1st
Dep't 1934); see Johnston v. Bruckbeimer, 133 App. Div. 649, 652, 118 N.Y.
Supp. 189, 191 (1st Dep't 1909).
5 Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Offlcers, 21 MiNN. L. REv. 263,
266 (1937).
6 See Wilson v. Mayor of New York, 1 Denio 595, 600 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1845) (mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary
act).
7 See Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391, 239 N.W. 29, 31 (1931) ; Stevens
v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435, 436 (1925).
8But see Silva v. MacAuley, 135 Cal. App. 249, 26 P.2d 887, 890 (1933),
wherein the court states: "The civil liability of an officer committing a tort
appears to be exactly the same as that of a civilian."
9 See Jennings, supra note 5, at 265.
10 See Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARV. L. REV.
447, 458 (1919) ; see Florio v. Mayor of Jersey City, 101 N.J.L. 535, 129 Atl.
470, 472 (1925).
"1See National Surety Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss. 115, 124 So. 251, 253 (1929).
The fact that the public has an interest in protecting the administrative officer
is illustrated in Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 643 (1938).
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light of the larger public interest that is always present in such cases. 12
This article is primarily concerned with the attitude of the courts
with respect to the tort liability of administrative officers of the State
of New York. To illustrate the milieu in which the New York view
presents itself, it will first be necessary to delineate the historical antecedents of the problem and then to evaluate briefly the positions
adopted in other jurisdictions.
General Background
The concept that "the king can do no wrong" seems at first
glance a quaint relic of medieval antiquity far removed from the contemporary American legal scene. It is therefore surprising to see
courts alluding to this principle as the basis for the concept of sovereign immunity 1 3 which renders the state immune from suit unless
its permission is first obtained.' 4 Other courts, however, prefer to
base immunity on the broad grounds of public policy.' 5
Closely related to the concept of sovereign immunity is the doctrine of attaching liability to public officials.' 6 The fact that an injured party lacks recourse against a sovereign on the principle of
respondeat superior17 has undoubtedly influenced courts to adopt a
more stringent attitude towards the administrative officer. This is
illustrated in the case of McCord v. High,'8 wherein it is stated that
since the plaintiff, a private citizen, had no other remedy, then, upon
the principles of justice, the action should lie against the public

officer.' 9

In New York, the state has consented by statute to be sued,
thus eliminating its protective cloak of immunity. 20 The Federal
Government, to a limited extent, has also discarded its immunity. 2 '
12 See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MiNN. L. REv.
263, 265 (1937).
23 See Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 221, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243,
245 (4th Dep't 1943), aff'd nt., 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E.2d 369 (1944); cf.
Matter of Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 68, 186 N.E. 203, 205 (1933).
14 See Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (1926); Sandel v. State,
126 S.C. 1, 119 S.E. 776 (1922).
1 "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
See also
depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 688
(1940).
'6 See Plumbing Supply Co. v. Board of Education, 32 S.D. 270, 142 N.W.
1131, 1132 (1913) ; see Jennings, supra note 12, at 263.
17 See Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 45 So. 66, 67 (1907); Chapman v.
State, 104 Cal. 690, 38 Pac. 457, 458 (1894).
18 24 Iowa (3 Stiles) 336 (1868).
29 Id. at 350 (concurring opinion).
20 N.Y. CT. Cr. Acr § 8. A consideration of this statute appears subsequently in this article.
2162 STAT. 933, 982 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (Supp.
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The courts have found little difficulty in extending immunity to
acts performed by executives, 22 legislators, 23 and judges, 24 within the
scope of their authority. 2 The earliest English cases, however, refused to extend this immunity to other public officers. 26 Chief Justice Holt, dissenting in Ashby v. White, went so far as to say that
these persons should pay even greater damages than private citizens
2
T This
in order to deter other officers from perpetrating like offenses.
28
decisions.
attitude is rarely reflected in the more recent
Since these early English cases, several tests have been utilized
to determine whether or not a particular administrative official is
liable. Most courts demand that the plaintiff first exhaust his other
remedies before he proceed against the officer. 29 Once this fact has
been established, the courts seek next to ascertain whether the officer
acted within the bounds of his jurisdiction.3 0 No officer, of course,
is absolved from liability for his private torts merely because he is an
officer.3 1 The problem arises only where he performs, or purports
to perform, his official functions. There is a presumption that the
32
administrative officer has acted within the scope of his jurisdiction.
A distinction is sometimes drawn between acts performed without authority, which render the officer liable, and those which are
merely in excess of authority. 3 The principle is easily stated but
the distinction is often difficult to draw. As a result, this differentia1951).

For a discussion of this statute, see DAvis,

ADmNIlSTRATiW

LAW

798 (1951).
22 See Sutherland v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320 (1874) ; see Plumbing Supply
Co. v. Board of Education, 32 S.D. 270, 142 N.W. 1131, 1132 (1913).
23 See Pawlowski v. Jenks, 115 Mich. 275, 73 N.W. 238 (1897); Amperse
v. Winslow, 75 Mich. 234, 42 N.W. 823 (1889).
24 See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U.S. 1871); Randall v. Brigham,
7 Wall. 523 (U.S. 1868).
25 See Bradley v. Fisher, supra note 24 at 354; see PRosszR, TORTS 1078
(1941).
26 See, e.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.
1774).
27 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 956, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (K.B. 1703) (dissenting
opinion).
28 A comparatively recent case which reflects this strict early English view
is D'Aquilla v. Anderson, 153 Miss. 549, 120 So. 434, 436 (1929).
29 First Nat. Bank v. Weld County, 264 U.S. 450 (1925) ; Sweeney v. Young,
82 N.H. 159, 131 Ati. 155 (1925); see Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MNN. L. REv. 263, 307 (1937).
30 See Stevens v. Black, 212 Mich. 281, 180 N.W. 503 (1920) ; see National
Surety
Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss. 115, 124 So. 251, 253 (1929).
31
See PRossER, ToRTs 1075 (1941).
32See Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 643 (1938); Wilson v. Spencer, 91 Neb. 169, 135 N.W. 546, 547 (1912).
3• See Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D. 227, 216 N.W. 898, 900 (1927); cf. Bradley

v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (U.S. 1871); Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268,
57 So. 860, 864 (1912). The case of Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82,
158 N.W. 182 (1916), is one in which the administrative officer clearly Went
far beyond the scope of his authority.
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tion has been adversely criticized.34 Nevertheless, most courts continue to rely upon this distinction. Consequently, when the officer
is charged with the obligation of passing upon the question of his own
jurisdiction, and he errs, he is usually protected.35
The question of jurisdiction has played a dominant part in the
rise of a concept of strict liability termed the "jurisdictional facts"
doctrine. This view found its first expression in the case of Miller
v. Horton, 6 a Massachusetts decision written by Mr. justice Holmes.
In that case the defendant, a health officer, shot the plaintiff's horse
in the belief that the horse was afflicted with glanders. The plaintiff
contended that the horse had not been so infected. The court ruled
that the statutory power given to the defendant only authorized him
to kill horses with glanders and that, since the jury found as a fact
that the horse had not been so affected, the defendant was liable for
acting without jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Holmes sought to justify
the severity of his conclusion on the ground that the plaintiff was not
accorded the regular judicial safeguards of notice and hearing before
his property was destroyed. 37 In essence, then, the "jurisdictional
facts" doctrine predicates a rule of complete liability which precludes
the defense of honest error. This law has been followed in other
jurisdictions 38 but its rationale has been criticized as "sterile logic." 39
The question of jurisdiction also arises with reference to the liability of an administrative officer who acts in accord with a statute
or ordinance subsequently declared unconstitutional. In strict logic
a void statute can give no authority and any acts performed in pursuance thereof are without jurisdiction. 40 For this reason, the earlier
cases rendered the administrative officer personally accountable for
any such acts.4 1 There has been, however, a marked reversal of this
earlier trend. More recent cases have held that public officers are
not liable if their acts were performed in good faith prior
to the judi42
cial determination of the statute's unconstitutionality.
In addition to a consideration of the jurisdictional problem, courts
have utilized other norms to determine the liability of administrative
34 See National Surety Co. v. Miller, supra note 30, 124 So. at 254, wherein
the court states: "We cannot grasp the conception that nonexistence can be
less than nonexistence, or that there can be different kinds of nonexistence, or
that that which is absent can be more absent."
35 See Bates v. Kitchel, 160 Mich. 402, 125 N.W. 684 (1910) ; see Sweeney
v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 Atl. 155, 157 (1925).
36 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
37 Id. at 102.

38

See Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904); Pearson v.

Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N.E. 854 (1891).
39 See DAVIs, ADMINIsTRA nv LAW 805 (1951).
40 See Note, 6 CoL L. REv. 586 (1906).
41 See Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341 (1875); Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky.
(3 A.K. Marsh.) 70 (1820).
42See Schloss & Kahn v. McIntyre, 147 Ala. 557, 41 So. 11 (1906);
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Hammond, 93 Iowa 520, 61 N.W. 1052
(1895); Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576, 49 N.W. 633 (1891).
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officers. Perhaps the standard most frequently applied is the distinction between acts judicial or quasi judicial 48 in nature and those
deemed ministerial. 44 The distinction was first drawn by those courts
which sought to extend to officers exercising quasi judicial functions

the immunity from suit granted to judges themselves. 45 To the extent
that the administrative officer was charged with the task of making
determinations which called for an exercise of his discretion, the courts
were inclined to extend judicial
immunity to those acts he performed47
in the course of his duties.48 Initially, full immunity was granted.
Later this immunity48was limited to those instances wherein the officer
acted in good faith.
Ministerial officers, on the other hand, are generally held liable
for their wrongful acts,49 although ordinarily such officers cannot be
adjudged liable for nonfeasance. 0 When the officer fails to do an
act which he is required to do, the courts sometimes treat this as a
breach of a duty owing to the public in general and not to the plaintiff
as an individual and, consequently, deny the plaintiff relief. 51 Similarly, if the act is done by the ministerial official pursuant to an order
valid on its face, no liability attaches.52 When, however, an officer
is charged with duties entailing both quasi judicial and ministerial
48 The term "quasi judicial" is considered synonymous with discretionary.
See State ex rel. Robertson v. Farmers' State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 39 S.W.2d
281, 282 (1931). It does not necessarily import the presence of the traditional
safeguards of notice and hearing. See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Offlcers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 277 (1937).
44 See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Brightman, 53 F.2d 161, 165 (8th Cir.
1931) ; First Nat. Bank v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204, 207 (1933); People
to Use of Munson v. Bartels, 138 Ill.
322, 27 N.E. 1091, 1092 (1891) ; Stevens
v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435, 436 (1925).
4 See Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 54 N.W. 938 (1893) ; Steele v. Dunham,
26 Wis. 393, 397 (1870).
46 See National Surety Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss. 115, 124 So. 251, 253 (1929)
Daniels v. Hathaway, 65 Vt. 247, 26 At. 970, 973 (1893).
47 See note 45 sapra.
48 See Keifer v. Smith, 103 Neb. 675, 173 N.W. 685 (1919) ; State ex rel.
Robertson v. Farmers' State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 39 S.W.2d 281 (1931) ; see
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Brightman, supra note 44 at 165; Daniels v. Hathaway, supra note 46, 26 Atl. at 973.
49 See Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S.E. 365 (1926); see Ham v.
Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 Pac. 462, 468 (1920); First Nat.
Bank v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204, 207 (1933).
50 Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435 (1925)
(ministerial officers' immunity limited in nonfeasance cases) ; Bolland v.
Gihlstorf, 134 Minn. 41, 158 N.W. 725 (1916). But see First Nat. Bank v.
Filer, supra note 49, 145 So. at 207; Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N.D. 478, 121
N.W. 616, 617 (1909).
53See Stevens v. North States Motor,' Inc., supra note 50; see Hipp v.

Farrell, 173 N.C. 167, 91 S.E. 831, 833 (1917).
5zHenke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378, 7 N.W. 623 (1880); Underwood v.
Robinson, 106 Mass. 296 (1871).
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acts, his liability
is determined on the basis of the nature of the act
13
performed.
The New York Position
As a prerequisite to relief in New York, the plaintiff must show
the breach of a duty owying to him as an individual; evidence of a
breach of an obligation owing to the public at large will not suffice. 54
The New York courts do not extend immunity for acts performed by officers without authority. Thus, in Butler v. Potter,55 the
court stated that acts judicial in nature performed without authority
are coram non judice and afford no immunity for the judicial officer
involved. The fact that the tortious act is quasi judicial in nature
does not render the officer immune from suit.56 If a discretionary
power, for example, were delegated to three school trustees, and two
of the trustees acted without the knowledge and concurrence of the
third, the act would be without jurisdiction and the trustees would
be liableY 7
The "jurisdictional facts" doctrine received a strong measure of
support in New York with the decision of People ex rel. Copcutt v.
Board of Health.58 The question came before the Court of Appeals
on a writ of certiorari to review the determination of a board of
health which had adjudged as nuisances certain dams owned by the
relator. The decision was rendered, significantly enough, two years
after Miller v. Horton,9 in which Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated
the concept of strict liability. The court, in the Copcutt case, said
that the administrative agency acquired jurisdiction to act by virtue
of the fact that there was an actual nuisance, and it strongly intimated
that the administrative- officers would otherwise have acted at their
peril.6 The reason for this is clearly manifested in the statement that
".. . no other view of the law would give adequate protection to private rights." 61 Here the court was concerned with a sufficient defense of those rights especially in view of the fact that the injured
parties were not given the 6opportunity
to be heard before they were
2
deprived of their property.
53 See Brown v. Nelson, 50 N.D. 589, 197 N.W. 223 (1924); Logan City
v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P2d 1085 (1935); see People to Use of Munson v.
Bartels, 138 I11.
322, 27 N.E. 1091, 1092 (1891).
54 Walker v. Broderick, 141 Misc. 391, 252 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
656 17 Johns. 145, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
See Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420, 425 (1875); cf. Butler v.
Potter,
supra note 55.
57See
Stephenson v. Hall, 14 Barb. 222, 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).
58 140 N.Y. 1, 35 N.E. 320 (1893).
GO
152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).

60 People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health, supra note 58 at 8, 35 N.E.

at 322.
61 Ibid.
62 See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21
263, 281 (1937).

MINx.
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There has been, in New York, a paucity of decisions with respect to the liability of an administrative officer acting pursuant to
an unconstitutional statute or ordinance. One of the first cases to
deal with this problem was Waterloo Water Manufacturing Co. v.
Shanahan which held the officer liable on the theory that he was acting without jurisdiction.6 3 A contrary decision was reached in Dexter
v. Alfred 64 where it was held that the fact that the officer acted pursuant to such a statute would be either a partial or a complete defense. Since it has also been held that a public officer is liable for
not acting in accord with a statute which he erroneously believed was
unconstitutional, 65 it would hardly seem just to place an officer in a
position whereby he would be compelled to determine correctly the
constitutionality of a particular statute in order to avoid personal
liability.
The New York courts have accepted the division of acts of public officers into the traditional quasi judicial and ministerial classifi67
cations. 66 A ministerial officer, unlike those of other jurisdictions,
is held liable for both misfeasance and nonfeasance.6 8 However, with
respect to the performance of functions quasi judicial in nature, a
study of the cases involved graphically points up the fact that the
law in this area is vague and unsettled.
One of the earliest cases to consider this question was Seaman
v. Patten which involved an official exercising discretionary powers.
The court held that such officer could not be adjudicated liable without evidence showing ". . . bad faith, corruption, malice or some misbehavior, or abuse of power." 69 Two subsequent decisions adopted
a completely different attitude. In each of these cases, the court explicitly stated that, once an administrative officer is charged with a
duty quasi judicial or discretionary in nature, he is completely immune
from suit for any act performed pursuant to such duty irrespective
of the motivation that inspired the act. 70 The only limitation imposed
1
is that the act not transcend the authority vested in the officer.
This divergence of opinion is evinced through the ensuing cases
that have been litigated in the courts of this state. There has been
63

58 Hun 50, 11 N.Y. Supp. 829 (Sup. Ct. 1890), rev'd oys other grounds,

128 N.Y. 345, 28 N.E. 358 (1891).
65464 Hun 636, 19 N.Y. Supp. 770 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
65 Clark v. Miller, 54 N.Y. 528 (1874).

66 See Clark v. Miller, supra note 65; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N.Y. 463 (1850); Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1846).
67

See note 50 supra.

68 See

Wright v. Shanahan, 149 N.Y. 495, 502, 44 N.E. 74, 75 (1896);
Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 462, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832).
69 2 Caines 312, 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
70 See Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, supra note 66 at 466; Weaver
v. Devendorf, supra note 66 at 120.
71 See Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846).

1954 ]

NOTES

support for the position of complete immunity 72 and that of limited
immunity.73 One of the more recent cases to touch upon the issue,
the lower court decision in Segal v. Jackson,74 quoted from East
River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly 75 which stated that the administrative officer exercising quasi judicial functions was completely immune from suit. It is interesting to note that the statement as it appeared in the latter case was that ".... the well-settled rule of law [is]

that no public officer is responsible in a civil suit for a judicial determination, however erroneous or wrong it may be, or however malicious even the motive which produced it." 76 In quoting this section,
the court in the Segal case omitted the last phrase 77 which in effect
enunciates the rule of complete immunity. It would be idle to indulge
in conjecture as to the purpose motivating the omission but it is a
significant manifestation of the unsettled state of the law to date.
Another interesting case in this area is Crayton v. Larabee.78 The
defendant, a health officer, was authorized by statute to quarantine
whenever he deemed such action necessary. 79 The plaintiff instituted
this suit to recover damages for his allegedly wrongful detention.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, held
that the defendant was immune from liability since he had acted reasonably. The court reasoned that the statute involved clearly empowered the defendant to act in accord with the results of a reasonable investigation."0 It did not seek to propound a general rule to
resolve the problem of the administrative officer's tort liability.
Court of Claims Act
The nexus between the concept of sovereign immunity and the
tort liability of public officers has been discussed elsewhere in this
article. The basis of the concept of sovereign immunity in New York
has been deemed to be a survival of the maxim that "the king can
do no wrong." 8 1 As a result of this immunity, the state was not
liable for the torts of its agents.8 2 However, the history of this ques72 See Van Deventer v. Long Island City, 139 N.Y. 133, 137, 34 N.E. 774,
775 (1893) ; East River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N.Y. 557, 559 (1883).
73 See Williams v. Weaver, 75 N.Y. 30, 34 (1878), aff'd, 100 U.S. 547
(1879); Teall v. Felton, 1 N.Y. 537, 547 (1848), aff'd, 12 How. 284 (U.S.

1851).

74 183 Misc. 460, 48 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
7593 N.Y. 557 (1883).
76 Id. at 559.
77 Segal v. Jackson, supra note 74 at 463, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
78220 N.Y. 493, 116 N.E. 355 (1917).

79 Id. at 503, 116 N.E. at 358.
80 Ibid.
81

See Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 221, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243,
245 (4th Dep't 1943), aff'd nere., 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E.2d 369 (1944).
82 Smith v. New York, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920); see Litchfield
v. Bond, 186 N.Y. 66, 83, 78 N.E. 719, 721 (1906).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 28

tion revealed a growing tendency to allow suit against the state 8 3
which culminated in the enactment of the Court of Claims Act in
1929 84 whereby the state consented to suit against itself upon the
85
principle of respondeat superior.
The statute has been termed
...a recognition and acknowledgment of a moral duty demanded
by the principles of equity and justice." 86
This statute, since it is in derogation of the principle of sovereign
immunity, has been strictly construed.87 The assumption of liability
by the state has not relieved the administrative officer of any personal liability for his tortious conduct.88 Whereas suit against the
officer as an individual may be brought in any court of competent
jurisdiction,8 9 the state must be sued in a special court created for
that purpose.
An individual about to commence a suit in tort against the state
must file a claim, or a notice of intention to file claim, within ninety
days subsequent to the accrual of his cause of action. 90 The harshness of this section is born of necessity so as to forestall raids on the
public till by the unscrupulous with fraudulent claims, the staleness
of which renders them difficult to disprove. 91 Thus it is easy to see
that those who fail to qualify under the provisions of this section are
remitted to their cause of action against the public officer as an individual where the only period of limitation is the customary one for
a tort action. 92
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion reveals the unsettled condition of the
law in New York with reference to the tort liability of administra83 See 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(Q), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION CoMmIssIoN
953 (1936).
84 Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 467.
This statute is presently N.Y. CT. Cr. Acr
§ 8 (formerly § 12-a).

85 See Jackson v. New York, 261 N.Y. 134, 138, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933);
Naramore
v. New York, 285 N.Y. 80, 84, 32 N.E.2d 800, 802 (1941).
88
See Jackson v. New York, supra note 85.
87
See Breen v. Mortgage Com'n, 285 N.Y. 425, 431, 35 N.E2d 25, 27
(1941).
8
8 Rhynders v. Greene, 255 App. Div. 401, 8 N.Y.S.2d 143 (3d Dep't 1938);
see Columbia Machine Works v. Long Island R.R., 267 App. Div. 582, 585,
47 N.Y.S.2d 383, 386 (1st Dep't 1944). Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act a judgment in an action against the United States constitutes a complete
bar to any action against the officer whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim. 62 STAT. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §2676 (Supp. 1951).
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See Breen v. Mortgage Comm'n, supra note 87 at 429, 35 N.E.2d at 27.
90 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 10 (courts may relax these rules in certain cases).
91 See 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(Q), REoRT, N.Y. LAw REmsIoI CommissioN
975 (1936).
92 N.Y.Civ. PRAc. Acr § 49.
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NOTES

tive officers. The problem is not one easy of solution because of the
many conflicting interests involved. Any proffered suggestion must
concern itself with the rights of the injured citizen, with the interest
of the public in the zealous and fearless administration of governmental functions, and with a proper regard for the requirements of
due process.
The distinction between acts without jurisdiction and those in
excess of jurisdiction has been drawn in order to provide a certain
amount of immunity for an officer who mistakenly goes beyond the
scope of his authority. The difficulty involved, however, is in determining whether an act is in either one or the other category. As a
result, the mere statement of the distinction is of little value in ascertaining whether or not liability should attach in a given factual situation. When the public officer has clearly transcended the bounds of
his authority, he should be held liable. Immunity should only be extended to those acts which the officer is authorized to perform. Thus,
if the statute directs that notice and hearing be accorded to the interested parties before a determination is made, the administrative
officer must comply with the statutory requirement. If the officer
should fail to comply with conditions precedent established by the
should extend to his acts, since he
governing statute, no immunity
93
acted without jurisdiction.
There are instances when the necessity for immediate action compels the administrative officer to act with respect to the person and
property of others without the regular judicial safeguards. Thus,
where a health officer is faced with the threat of a spreading plague,
it is imperative that steps be quickly taken without notice and hearing,
for example, in the imposition of a quarantine. If such officer errs,
should he be held personally liable? If he were not granted immunity
for reasonable acts which he performs in such moments of crisis, he
would fulfill his function hesitatingly and the whole community might
suffer as a result. On the other hand, the private citizen should be
reimbursed for any losses he incurred which were in actuality unnecessary. The practical solution would be to grant the immunity to
the public officer and to have the state respond in damages for any
losses which a private citizen unnecessarily suffers.
It has been indicated that the extent of the liability of an officer
acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute is unsettled in this state.
An officer should not be forced to determine the constitutionality of
a particular law. When the official acts in accord with a statute
prior to the judicial declaration of its unconstitutionality, full immunity
should be given to the officer. The state itself should answer for any
damages in these instances.
The necessity for extending a measure of immunity to officers
exercising quasi judicial functions becomes apparent once the nature
of the resultant acts is considered. These actions are the effect of
the discretion of the officers performing them. The officers here are
charged with the duty of making decisions either of law or of facts.
93

Cf. Stevens v. Black, 212 Mich. 281, 180 N.W. 503 (1920) ; see Rock v.

Carney, 216 Mich. 280, 185 N.W. 798 (1921).
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Since it is in the best interest of the public that they exercise their
functions zealously and fearlessly, they should not be unduly hampered or intimidated by the threat of legal action should they err.
The next question concerns the amount of immunity that should be
extended. It is submitted that a test of reasonableness should be
applied. In determining whether a public officer is to be held personally liable, the jury should decide whether the officer acted reasonably. The concept of reasonableness assumes that the officer has
acted in good faith and that there was substantial evidence warranting the course of action pursued. To adequately protect the private
citizen, the burden of proof should be on the officer to establish the
reasonableness of his act.
The suggestions made above do not amount to a panacea. The
many facets of every legal problem preclude the possibility of pat
solutions satisfactory to all interested parties. It is hoped, however,
that they will recommend themselves as a workable method of approach to the problem of the tort liability of administrative officers.

)X
THE RELGIOUS PROTECTION CLAUSES IN NEW YORK'S
CHILDREN'S COURT ACTS

At the turn of the century, a group of citizens in Illinois impressed upon the legislature of that state the need for a court for
children.' This legal and sociological development rapidly extended
to other states, so that today, a scant half-century later, most states
have separate courts for children.2 The idea was born of necessity.
Prior to that time, children who committed offenses were placed on
equal footing with adults,3 and were subjected to the same penalties
as more mature criminals. Since, however, criminal jurisprudence
includes the concept of rehabilitation, 4 and since impressionable children should be trained, guided and protected, special treatment and
consideration for such children is entirely warranted.
'See Neary, Selecting Clients for the Juvenile Court, YEARBOOK, NAT.
Children, however, were tried in a separate
PROBATION Ass'N 209 (1936).
session of the criminal court as early as 1863 in Massachusetts. 6 N.Y.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITEE, PROBLEMS RELATING To BILL
There are indications that
OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE 659 (1938).
sentences imposed upon children during the colonial period were not actually
carried out. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 17 (1953); TEL-MrRS AND REINEMANN, THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 69 (1950).
2See 6 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUrIONAL CONVENTION COMmITIEE, op. cit.
supra note 1; NEARY, op. cit. supra note 1.
3 See TEETERS AND REiNEMANN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70.
4 See ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCTION 40 et seq. (1937);
SNYDER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23 (1953).

